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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
the Personal Representative 
with Will Annexed of the 
Estate of Penelope Kopoulos, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
HELEN CHLEPAS, 
Defendant-
Responden t. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16787 
Plaintiff, as the personal representative with Will annexed 
of the estate of Penelope Kopoulos, brought an action to determine 
the ownership of two certificates of deposit issued in the name 
of the deceased, Penelope Kopoulos, and the defendant Helen 
Chlepas, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Judge, Honorable Dean E. Conder, sitting with-
out a jury, found the issues in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff. The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, and based thereon entered a Judgment awarding 
defendant the certificates of deposit free and clear of any claim 
by the estate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the Judgment 
entered in this matter. Respondent seeks to have this Court 
affirm the decision of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Penelope Kopoulos died testate on February 24, 1977. At t~ 
time of her death there existed two savings certificates (total 
face value of $60,000.00) held in joint tenancy with full rights 
of survivorship with the defendant Helen Chlepas. Those certifi-
cates had been taken out three years prior to the death of 
Penelope Kopoulos. 
Penelope was married to George Kopoulos. Both were of Gre~ 
ancestry and lived in the United States from 1934 until their 
respective deaths. George Kopoulos died in 1973. At the time of 
his death a joint English will of George and Penelope was admitted 
to probate. In addition, the following joint tenancy accounts 
existed between George and Penelope and passed to Penelope upon 
George's death by right of survivorship: 
1) A Lockhart Co. Diamond Thrift Certificate 
No. 7216 for $2,000 to George J. Kopoulos 
or Penelope Kopoulos. 
2) An American Savings & Loan Association 
. .. 
... 
... 
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Certifi9ate No. HOCD40267 for $10,014.82 
to George J. Kopoulos and Penelope Kopoulos. 
3) Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Savings Certificate No. 311055 for $18,369.91 
to George J. Kopoulos and Penelope Kopoulos. 
4} A joint tenancy certificate with George 
Kopoulos which was cashed to open a joint 
checking account with Helen Chlepas as 
joint tenant. 
Penelope served as the Executrix of George's estate and 
signed the Affidavit of Appraisal for inheritance tax purposes 
regarding the joint tenancy certificates. 
After George's death Penelope placed their re~idence for 
sale and signed all of the customary English-written documents 
relating to listing, sale and conveyance of the property as 
follows: 
1) Signed a listing agreement with Liljenquist 
Realty (P. 3 of Exhibit 8). 
2} Signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase (Diamant's testimony). 
3) Signed a Warranty Deed conveying the 
property (piamant's testimony). 
4) Signed a Receipt for Disbursement checks 
and seller's Closing Statement (Exhibit 8). 
The proceeds from the sale of this residence were used by 
Penelope to purchase the two joint tenancy certificates herein 
-3-
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sued upon. The joint tenancy was created by Penelope with Helen 
Chlepas. Helen was the goddaughter of Penelope, Penelope having 
no children of her own and no other close relatives. Possession 
of the joint tenancy certificates was given to Helen Chlepas on 
the day of their creation and remained with her throughout 
Penelope's remaining life and until placed into court for deter- a 
mination of ownership. The interest on the joint tenancj accoun~ li 
was used during the lifetime of Penelope to pay her living and 
maintenance expenses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE 
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT CONSTRUING 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 75-6-104(1) 1 
The applicable statutory provision governing this case is 
Section 75-6-104(1) of Utah Code Annotated which provides as 
follows: 
Sums remaining on deposit after the death of 
a party to a joint account belong to the 
surviving party or parties as against the 
estate of the decedent unless there is clear 
and convincing evidence of a different inten-
tion at the time the account was created. 
(emphasis added) 
A mere preponderance of evidence to rebut the presumption of 
rightful survival ownership is insuf f icient--the statute requiri~ 
that the presumption must be overcome by "clear and convincing" 
evidence. 
1 Erroneously cited in Appellant's Brief as Section 75-6-105(1). 
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"Clear and convincing" evidence was defined by this court in 
the case of Greener v. Greener, 160 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949). 
The Greener case involved a similar fact situation to the case on 
appeal herein in that the validity of a joint account with rights 
o~ survivorship was being challenged. This Court, following the 
common law rule, announced the intent of the parties, as estab-
lished by the written joint tenancy agreement, would be presumed 
and upheld unless it was shown by "clear and convincing" evidence 
that the parties intended to have a different effect than that 
expressed in the writing. In a long discussion as to the meaning 
of "clear and convincing" evidence, this Court stated: 
... that proof is convincing which carries 
with it not only the power to persuade the 
mind as to the probable truth or correctness 
of the fact it purports to prove, but has 
the element of clinching such truth or 
correctness. Clear and convincing truth 
clinches what might be otherwise only prob-
able to the mind ... 
* * * 
But for the matter to be clear and con-
vincing to a particular mind it must at 
least have reached the point where there 
remains no serious or substantial doubt as 
to the correctness of the conclusion. A 
mind which was of the opinion that it was 
convinced and yet which entertained, not a 
slight but a reasonable doubt as to the 
correctness of its conclusion, would seem 
to be in a state of confusion. 
Id. at 204-05. 
In the case of Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621 
(1953) this Court held that a written contract would only be 
found void for mistake where there was clear and convincing 
evidence, and that in order to be clear and convincing the 
-5-
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evidence " ... must be such that there is not serious nor sub-
stantial doubt what the true intent is." Id. at 624. 
In addition, the "clear and convincing" evidence must show i 
present intention to create other than joint ownership with 
survivorship rights at a specified time, that time being " ... at 
the time the account was created," and evidence or inference of~ 
subsequent different intent is irrelevant. The fact that the 
joint creator of the joint tenancy account may have changed her 
mind as to her intentions is irrelevant to the validity of the 
joint tenancy at issue here. The rule in Section 75-6-104(1) is 
essentially the same as the common law prior to 1977. In 
Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 (1961), the 
Court enunciated a rule similar to the present statute, and not~ 
that 
... such rule is applicable whether the parties 
are living or where death has intervened. 
Nor would the fact that the original owner 
may have changed his mind after the creation 
of the account alter the applicability of that 
rule. 
Id. at 184. 
In the Tangren case the decedent had established a joint 
account with the defendant. Four days before the decedent's 
death he filed an action against the defendant seeking an adjudi-
cation that the accounts were his sole property and that the 
defendant had no interest therein. Notwithstanding this obvious 
change of mind on the part of the decedent, the Court upheld the 
validity of the joint accounts and, as evidenced by the above-
quoted cite from said case, held that the crucial time at which 
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the intent of the decedent is relevant is the time of the crea-
tion of the account and a subsequent change of mind does not 
affect the validity of the joint account. 
A recent case directly in point on this issue is Pagano v. 
Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975). In that case the evidence 
showed that prior to her death the deceased placed $73,544.00 in 
joint tenancy with one of her daughters. Four other children of 
the deceased later came into court and testified that the sur-
viving joint tenant told each of them prior to their mother's 
death that the mother had stated she wanted the joint tenant 
daughter to divide the proceeds equally among all the children. 
The trial court accepted such statements as evidence of an intent 
not to pass ownership by survivorship to the joint tenant, and 
imposed a trust on the money for the benefit of all the children. 
This Court reversed that decision and upheld the joint account 
stating: 
The joint account is a tripartite contract 
between the bank and the joint depositors; 
and it is also a contract between the 
joint depositors themselves. Upon a 
showing of its due execution, it is 
entitled to the presumption of validity 
and should be given effect according to 
its terms. That is, it creates an owner-
ship of the funds in joint-tenancy, with 
a right of survivorship so that upon the 
death of one, the other becomes the 
owner of the funds. It is of course sub-
ject to attack only on the same basis as 
any other written agreement or contract, 
by showing that because of fraud, duress, 
undue influence, mistake, incapacity or 
other infirmity that in equity and good 
conscience it should not be enforced. But 
because of the verity accorded written 
-7-
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instruments, its effect can be overcome 
only by clear and convincing evidence. 
* * * 
In order to establish such a trust, 
[destroy the joint-tenancy with one daughter 
and divide it up among all the children] it 
would have to appear that such was the in-
tention of the settler at the time of the 
creation of the joint account.--rrhat is, if 
the account was originally created as a true 
joint account with right of co-ownership and 
survivorship in Mary [daughter], as it 
appears to have been, that status would not 
be changed even if the mother Lucy had at 
some subsequent time orally made the here-
inabove quoted declaration to Mary. 
Id. at 454-55. (emphasis is that of the 
Court and not added by this writer) 
The estate's sole evidence in this case that the deceased 
did not intend to create a joint tenancy account and that her 
godchild Helen Chlepas received the funds by survivorship was the 
testimony, received over the objection of the defendant, that 
eleven days prior to her death the deceased allegedly met with an 
attorney for the purpose of preparing a new will (not the one 
herein admitted to probate) wherein she reallocated or made a 
different distribution of her estate than would be effective if 
the joint tenancy certificates remained in force at her.death. 
The will was never prepared and never signed or executed. The 
trial court found, in regards to said evidence: 
4. The estate introduced evidence that on 
or about February 13, 1977 (eleven days prior 
to her death), the decedent met with an attorney 
for the purpose of preparing a new Will and 
there gave instructions concerning the distri-
bution of her property which, on its face, infers 
a different intent than manifest on the joint-
tenancy certificates insofar as distribution of 
her entire estate is concerned. The proposed 
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new Will, however, was never prepared nor 
executed by the deceased prior to her death. 
5. The estate offered no evidence of any 
intention at the time the joint accounts were 
opened to create a relationship any different 
than that expressed on the contracts themselves, 
to wit: that ownership of the certificates was 
in the deceased and the defendant as joint ten-
ants with full rights of survivorship. 
6. The court finds no evidence that at the 
time the accounts were created the deceased was 
acting under duress, fraud, undue influence or 
incapacity, or that the parties intended an 
agreement any different than that expressed on 
the face of the certificates. The court finds 
no evidence which would justify equitable 
reformation of the certificates. 
Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. 
In doing so, the District Court correctly followed and 
applied the following rules laid down by this Court: 
Tangren: "Nor would the fact that the original 
owner may have changed his mind after the 
creation of the account alter the applicability 
of that rule." Id. 
Pagano: "In order to establish such a trust, it 
would have to appear that such was the intention 
of the settler at the time of the creation of the 
joint account. lfihat is-;-I°f the account was 
originally created as a true joint account with 
rights of co-ownership and survivorship in Mary, 
as it appears to have been, the status would not 
be changed even if the mother Lucy had at some 
subsequent time orally made the hereinabove 
quoted declaration to Mary." Id. 
Not only did the estate fail to offer "clear and convincing" 
evidence of a different intent "at the time of creation of the 
account," the trial record shows evidence that the account was 
indeed established for purpose of creating a survivorship/owner-
ship intent. 
-9-
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Under the most recent case of this Court dealing with the 
identical issues as are involved herein, "possession" of the 
passbook or certificates was a significant indicia of ownership/ 
survivorship rights. In the case of McCullough v. Wasserback, 
30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974) the decedent created a joint 
tenancy account with the defendant four years prior to her death, 
and two weeks before she died and at a time when she was ill and 
going to the hospital she delivered possession of the certifica~s 
to the defendant. This Court, in upholding the validity of the 
joint tenancy account, said that such conduct (possession) was 
persuasive by noting: 
If there is merit to plaintiff's [the estate] 
argument that Anna's [the deceased] keeping 
possession of the passbook and certificate 
shows an intention to retain ownership, there 
is also merit to defendant's [the survivor] 
argument that turning them over to her before 
she went to the hospital indicates recognition 
of the joint ownership and right of survivorship. 
Id. at 694. 
This Court in upholding the joint tenancy account further noted: 
We can see no possible justification for 
saying that it was 'solely for convenience' 
in handling Anna's [the deceased] money to 
put it jointly in Joyce's [the survivor] 
name four years prior to going to the 
hospital, or to turn possession over to 
Joyce. 
Id. at 694. (emphasis added) 
In this case the deceased gave the passbooks to her god-
daughter on the day they were created, and more than three years 
prior to her death, and the goddaughter had them in her possession 
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until placed into this Court for determination of ownership. 
In addition, the record shows that the deceased was very 
close to her goddaughter, Helen Chlepas, and that said god-
daughter was the natural object of her bounty and affection. 
Without any family or relatives to turn to, the deceased relied 
upon her religious obligation, right and responsibility of god-
mother and godchild relationship with Helen Chlepas, and Helen 
took an interest in and care of the deceased and a bond developed 
between them that was very evident in the record. Another relative 
testified and described the relationship between the deceased and 
Helen Chlepas as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Hintze) Were you able to personally 
observe any type of a relationship existing 
between those two individuals? 
A. ·Do you mean before her death or after? 
Q. Before yes. Before Penelope's death. 
A. They were very close. In fact--shall I go 
further back like when Helen's husband died? 
Q. Summarize after the death of Mr. Kopoulos 
what you personally observed regarding those--
A. She depended on Helen for everything. Her 
grocery shopping ... 
Q. Just if you will, Mrs. Bowden, describe what 
you observed or what you heard in relationship 
to that apparent relationship. 
A. Well, I would go with Helen to Mrs. Kopoulos' 
house. Helen would take groceries to her 
because she was unable to go grocery shopping. 
She would ask Helen to do different things 
she had in her house. She used to talk to 
her privately and I could hear because I was 
just about next to her. 
-11-
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Q. How often would you say, between the death of 
Mr. Kopoulos in 1973 to November of 1974, how 
of ten would you observe Helen and Penelope 
Kopoulos together? 
A. At least twice a week. 
Q. And would that usually occur at Mrs. Kopoulos' 
home or where? 
A. Just because she was really unable to travel 
unless Helen took her to a doctor's appoint-
ment or wherever she had to go. She depended 
bn Helen to take her to these places. 
Q. Were you able to hear at any time any conver-
sation or in that relationship between Helen 
and Penelope was described by either party? 
A. I don't understand that. 
Q. Well, you are familiar with the term Goddaughter? 
A. Yes. I sure am. 
Q. Are you Greek Orthodox? 
A. Yes. I am. 
Q. --by religion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you understand what that term meant 
in the Greek Orthodox religion? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. You ever hear Mrs. Kopoulos speak to Helen 
wherein that relationship was discussed at all? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where did that discussion occur? 
A. Oh, at the hospital, at Helen's home, up at 
the nursing home where the lady that was taking 
care of Mrs. Kopoulos--
Q. That the same conversation, which I take it 
has occurred more than one time? 
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A. Many times. 
Q. And would that be during what period of time? 
A. Can't say specific time, but it was all the time. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 58-60. 
The record shows that the deceased made numerous comments of 
her "intent" to "take care of Helen," an obvious reference to a 
bequest of some kind. 
Q. (By Mr. Hintze) What did Mrs. Kopoulos say 
in regard to her Goddaughter? 
A. To her Goddaughter? Just kept telling her--
begging her to stay with her because she had 
no one else. She depended on her to do things 
for her and not to leave her, because she 
didn't know where to turn to. Helen kept 
telling her we are not going to leave you. 
There is a lot of us here to take care of 
you. She called Helen words like Manaraki. 
Q. A Greek word, m·eaning what now? 
A. It's an endearment word, my dear, or darling, 
or something. But this is how she referred 
to Helen all the time. 
Q. At any time in those conversations at Mrs. 
Kopoulos' home, or any time after George 
Kopoulos' death, and say prior to November 
of 1974, did you have occasion to ever hear 
any conversations between Mrs. Kopoulos and 
Helen Chlepas regarding whether or not Mrs. 
Kopoulos was going to take care of Helen? 
A. Yes. She always made comments like that.· 
Trial Transcript, pp. 60-61. 
After the creation of the joint tenancy accounts in 
November of 1974, the deceased prior to her death often referred 
to having left money to Helen: 
-13-
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Q. (By Mr. Hintze) Tell us when such conversations 
occurred. Is that the first time you can recall, 
as best as you can in dates? 
A .... And the minute we would walk in the door, 
she would say to Helen this word Manaraki 
again. Welcome my dear, or whatever. And 
she would say to her God bless her, and tell 
her that she was going to take care of her. 
Q. How often did you hear that statement made? 
A. I always heard it when Helen brought her to 
my house for dinner on Sundays. 
Q. Now, after November of 1974, did you ever 
have occasion to receive telephone calls from 
the deceased? 
A. Two or three times a week. 
Q. And what customarily would be the substance 
of those conversations? 
* * * 
A. Well, she would call me on the phone and say 
can you get in touch with Helen? And I would 
say have you tried to call her? And she would 
say yes. But maybe I'm dialing wrong or some-
thing, because of some other voice would come 
on--someone that was working at Helen's place. 
I don't know. So I said maybe Helen can't get 
away right now. Probably busy and has to 
hire someone to work for her. And she said to 
me, "Look, with what I have left, Helen, she 
doesn't have to work." Always this. I heard 
this three, four times a week. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 61-62. 
Clearly the Court reached the proper result in failing to 
find by clear and convincing evidence an intent different from 
that shown on the written joint tenancy certificates, that at t~ 
time they were created the intent was to pass ownership by right 
of survivorship of the certificates to Helen Chlepas. 
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO FIND THAT THE ESTATE'S ARGUMENTS 
REGARDING THE DECEASED'S ILLITERACY 
ALTERED THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF 
THE JOINT TENANCY WRITTEN CONTRACTS. 
It should be pointed out, initially, that no allegation or 
averment exists anywhere in the pleadings that the deceased 
lacked capacity or other state of mind to enter into a joint 
tenancy savings contract or that the joint tenancy accounts arose 
through fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence. When the 
inability of the deceased to read or write was first mentioned in 
the trial, timely objection was made to that evidence. 
Mr. Hintze: May the record just show that my 
objection goes to any statement 
regarding the deceased's capacity 
on the basis that that has not 
been pled and is irrelevant. My 
continuing ongoing objection on 
Rule 9(d) requiring that fraud, mis-
take, or conditions of the mind must 
be affirmatively pled. 
The Court: You may have a continuing objection 
for the record. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 7-8. 
Without having pled lack of capacity or fraud, that issue 
was never properly before the Court. In Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 
364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934) this Court stated: 
Where there is a joint agreement execut~d by . 
the parties which clearly declares the intention 
to create a joint interest of each in the deposit 
or credit, the courts will sustain such inten-
tion thus expressed, especially where the contract 
is not attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or 
other infirmity. 
-15-
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Where such intention is clearly expressed in a 
written contract executed by the parties, which 
remained unaltered, and there is no fraud, un-
due influence, mistake, or other infirmity 
alleged, the question of intention ceases to 
be an issue and the courts are bound by the 
agreement. 
Id. at 718-19. (emphasis added) 
The trial court properly found, in regards to the signi-
ficance of the deceased's illiteracy, as follows: 
3. During her lifetime the decedent did not 
write or speak the English language, but it was 
her practice to conduct business utilizing 
the English language by having the written docu-
ments read and explained to her. Specifically, 
the evidence showed that she entered into and 
signed a real estate Listing Agreement, Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, Warranty 
Deed, Receipt for Disbursement & Closing State-
ment, and that she was familiar with the use, 
creation and function of joint tenancy accounts 
as she and her husband, before his death, had 
numerous joint tenancy savings and/or checking 
accounts. This court has admitted to probate a 
document written in the English language and 
signed by the deceased as her Last Will and 
Testament. 
Findings of Fact, No. 3. 
Such finding is amply supported by the evidence and, in fact, 
Appellant admits that such a finding is amply supported by the 
evidence. 
The Trial Court properly found from the 
evidence in Finding of Fact No. 3 (Tr. 37): 
"During her lifetime, the decedent 
did not write or speak the English 
language." 
However, contrary to the evidence, the 
following statement was included: 
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"But it was her practice to conduct 
business utilizing the English language 
by having the written documents read and 
explained to her." 
Plaintiff contends that this last statement 
is supported by the evidence but was not appli-
cable to the facts involved in this case. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 11. 
Appellant then argues that the defendant did not prove that 
she followed that established practice and explained the joint 
tenancy transaction to the deceased. Two things are wrong with 
that argument. First, Helen Chlepas cannot, by reason of the 
dead man's statute, even offer such testimony and Appellant is 
aware of that fact and made vehement objection to her proffered 
testimony on any subject (see Trial Transcript, pp. 51-53). 
Second, the burden of proof lies on the estate to establish the 
fraud, mistake, or lack of capacity and not on the survivor to 
show that the transaction was free of those conditions. Further-
more, the survivor is entitled to the legal presumption of 
validity of contracts executed by an illiterate individual. 
The law is very clear that the illiteracy of an individual 
who signed a written contract does not affect the validity or 
presumption of validity of said contract unless there is evidence 
of fraud. 
As a general rule, one who accepts a written 
contract is conclusively presumed to know 
its contents and to assent to them, in the 
absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or 
other wrongful act by another contracting 
party. 
* * * 
-17-
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The rule that one who signs a contract is 
presumed to know its contents has been 
applied even to contracts of illiterate 
persons on the ground that if such persons 
are unable to read, they are negligent if 
they fail to have the contract read to them. 
If a person cannot read the instrument, it 
is as much his duty to procure some reliable 
person to read and explain it to him, before 
he signs it, as it would be to read it 
before he signed it if he were able to do so ... 
(emphasis added) 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 149 "Contracts" pp. 490-9. 
In Sutherland v. Sutherland, 358 P.2d 766 (Kan. 1961) the 
contracting party was an elderly woman with a 4th grade education 
and substantially illiterate, and suit was filed challenging a 
contract to sell real property. The court in considering the 
validity of the contract stated: 
The general rule is that a contracting 
party is bound by an agreement to which 
he assents, where the assent is uninfluenced 
by fraud, violence, undue influence, or the 
like, and he will not be permitted to say he 
did not intend to agree to its terms. A 
contracting party is under a duty to learn the 
contents of a written contract before signing 
it, and if, without being a victim of fraud, 
he fails to read the contract or otherwise 
to learn its contents, he signs the same at 
his peril and is estopped to deny his 
obligations thereunder. If a person cannot 
read an instrument, it is as much his duty 
to procure some reliable person to read and 
explain it, before he signs it, as it would 
be to read it before he signed it if he were 
able to do so, and his failure to obtain a 
reading and explanation of it is such gross 
negligence as will estop him from avoiding 
it on the ground that he was ignorant of its 
contents. 
Id. at 776, 785. 
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see also, Maltby v. Sumner, 219 P.2d 395 (Kan. 1950); Johnson 
v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945) at 137 and cases cited therein 
under headnote (2.3]. 
No presumption of invalidity arises merely because a person 
is illiterate. 
Nor is a presumption of undue influence 
raised merely by evidence of inability 
to read or write. 
25 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 43, p. 403 
The party who alleges fraud as the basis 
of a cause of action or defense has the 
burden of establishing it by the requisite 
quantum of proof in order to prevail in 
the action. Since in the absence of 
particular circumstances, the presumption 
is in favor of good faith, innocence and 
honesty, and against fraud ... 
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 437, pp. 5_96-7 
The facts in this case clearly establish that the deceased 
was able to transact business by having explained to her the 
English writings to which she then assented by signing the same 
or by giving instructions that documents be prepared expressing 
in writing her desires and intent. 
Indeed, the Appellant is hardly in a position to advance an 
argument that the deceased lacked capacity to enter into written 
agreements of any kind, since it is the duly appointed executor 
of the estate of Penelope Kopoulos to probate a document written 
in English and signed by the deceased as her Last Will and 
Testament. It would be a blatant incongruity to hold that the 
illiteracy of the deceased prevented her from entering into a 
-19-
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written joint tenancy agreement and thereby allow the sums 
therein on deposit to be distributed pursuant to a written Will 
executed by the same deceased. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly construed and applied the existing 
law concerning joint tenancy accounts and, since there was no 
"clear and convincing" evidence of any intent different than that 
inferred by reason of the written joint tenancy account, the 
judgreent in favor of the defendant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ 
Harold A. Hintze 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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